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Sammendrag 
Arbeidsmarkedsreguleringer og inntektsforskjeller i OECD land.  
Inntektsforskjellene vokste raskt i de fleste anglosaksiske land på slutten av 1970-tallet. De har typisk 
vært lavere Kontinental-Europa og Norden, men de siste tiårene har imidlertid inntektsforskjellene økt 
i flere land. De anglosaksiske landene, sammen med Portugal, har fortsatt betydelig høyere 
inntektsforskjeller enn kontinental Europa.  
 
To vanlige forklaringer på tiltagende inntektsforskjeller er; globalisering og teknologisk endring, jfr. 
Acemoglu og Autor (2011). En tredje teori som også er grunnlaget for denne artikkelen er "Krugman 
hypotesen" (Krugman (1994)). Ifølge denne hypotesen, kan økende inntektsforskjeller forklares med 
et relativ fall i etterspørselen etter ufaglært arbeidskraft i kombinasjon med en fleksibel lønnsstruktur. 
Det er flere empiriske analyser som støtter "Krugman hypotesen", f.eks Blau og Kahn (1996) og 
Koeniger et al. (2007). Sistnevnte finner at en vesentlig del av inntektsforskjellene blant menn i 
fulltidsstillinger i 11 OECD-land i perioden 1973-1998, kan forklares av arbeidsmarkedsreguleringer 
når man kontrollerer for endringer i teknologi, handel og etterspørselsforhold.  
 
Vi benytter modellen i Koeniger et al. (2007), men på et dobbelt så stort datasett. Datasettet dekker 
både en lengre tidsperiode (1973-2011) og 9 ekstra OECD-land. Våre resultater støtter i hovedsak 
funnene i Koeniger et al. (2007), men arbeidsmarkedsreguleringer har noe mindre betydning 
sammenlignet med de opprinnelige resultatene. Økt stillingsvern, høyere nivå og varighet på 
arbeidsledighetstrygd, høyere koordinering og økte minimumslønninger reduserer inntektsforskjellene. 
 
Vi har undersøkt to mulige forklaringer til at reguleringer i arbeidsmarkedet har mindre betydning for 
inntektsforskjeller enn tidligere; endring i reguleringer av midlertidige og faste stillinger samt økt 
mobilitet av arbeidskaft mellom landegrenser. Tidligere analyser har vist at stillingsvern for 
midlertidige og faste kontrakter har ulike effekter på sysselsettingen, se Nunziata og Staffolani (2007). 
Dersom endrede reguleringer øker sysselsettingen kan det igjen øke inntektsforskjellene, siden 
marginale arbeidstakere med lavere produktivitet kommer inn i arbeidsmarkedet. Blanchard og 
Landier (2002) har også vist at mindre regulering av midlertidige kontrakter har økt andelen ansatte i 
midlertidige stillinger. Hvis denne gruppen har lavere forhandlingsmakt, vil dette også øke 
lønnsforskjeller. Vi finner at strengere regulering av midlertidige stillinger reduserer lønnsforskjellene, 
mens strengere reguleringer av faste stillinger øker inntektsforskjellene. Vi finner også at økt 
innvandring øker inntektsforskjellene i den nederste delen av inntektsfordelingen, men at 
minimumslønninger til en viss grad demper effekten av økt innvandring. 
1 Introduction
Income inequality started growing rapidly in most Anglo Saxon countries in the late 1970s.
Levels of income inequality have typically been lower in Continental Europe and the Nordic
countries than in the Anglo-Saxon countries, but many of the former countries have witnessed
growing inequality in the past decades. The Anglo Saxon countries, along with Portugal,
still have a substantially higher level of income inequality than Continental Europe. France
is the only OECD country that has seen an overall decline in income inequality over the past
decades, and two thirds of OECD countries have had growing inequality in the recent years
(OECD (2011b)).
Two common explanations for growing inequality in developed countries are; globaliza-
tion and skill biased technological change, cf. Acemoglu and Autor (2011). A third theory,
which is also the foundation for this paper, is the “Krugman hypothesis” (Krugman (1994)).
According to this hypothesis, rising inequality can be explained by a relative fall in the de-
mand for low-skilled workers in combination with a ﬂexible wage structure. On the contrary,
a combination of a relative fall in demand with a rigid wage structure increases unemploy-
ment.
There are several empirical analysis which support the “Krugman hypothesis”, e.g. Blau
and Kahn (1996) and Koeniger et al. (2007). Blau and Kahn (1996) have looked at the
eﬀect of labor market institutions vs. market forces in explaining the large deviation in
wage inequality in the USA in the middle to late 1980s. Their ﬁndings suggest that cross
country diﬀerences in labor market institutions provide the most persuasive explanation for
national diﬀerences. Koeniger et al. (2007) look at the role of labor market institutions in
explaining diﬀerences in wage dispersion between 11 OECD countries in the period 1973-
1998 for men in full time positions, when controlling for technology, trade and supply and
demand conditions. They ﬁnd that changes in institutions can explain a substantial part of
changes in male wage inequality.
By estimating the empirical model for wage inequality developed by Koeniger et al.
(2007) on a double sample size, with both a longer time frame 1973-2011 and 9 additional
OECD-countries, our results mainly support the ﬁndings in Koeniger et al. (2007). However,
several of the variables have lower eﬀect than previously reported.
We investigate two potential explanations to lower eﬀect of labour market institutions
on inequality diﬀerences; the measure of employment protection is decomposed into employ-
ment protection of temporary and regular positions and a variable representing immigration
ﬂow is added to the analysis. Previous work on separate measures for employment protec-
tion for temporary and regular contracts have revealed diﬀerent eﬀects on employment to
population rates, cf. Nunziata and Staﬀolani (2007). Increased employment shares might
increase the income inequality, since marginal workers with lower productivity enters the
labor market. In addition, Blanchard and Landier (2002) found that reforms of regulations
of employment protection for temporary contracts in the short run have increased the share
of employees in temporary positions. If this group has lower bargaining power, this will also
increase wage inequality. By investigating the variation in data, variation in regulation of
employment protection of temporary contracts stems from the extended time period. We
are therefore able to estimate separate eﬀects of employment protection for temporary and
regular contracts.
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Along with an increase in wage inequality, most industrialized countries have seen a
substantial increase in immigration over the past decades. This has lead to a huge empirical
debate on the socioeconomic impact of immigration, and on the eﬀect it has on native
workers wages. The “Krugman Hypothesis” would imply increased wage dispersion if higher
immigration induce increased supply of low-skilled labor and/or will change the size of union
density if immigrants do not mimic the native population with respect to union coverage.
We make a ﬁrst attempt to address this topic, and include the immigration rates to the
former analysis disregarding that higher inequality might aﬀect the immigration rates.
Finally we perform two robustness checks to our results. First, theoretical literature
has pointed out that labour market institutions also aﬀect unemployment, see Pissarides
(2000) and Layard et al. (1991). How reliable are our results since some of the changes in
unemployment are induced by changes in labour market institutions? Nickell et al. (2005) and
Sparrman (2011) have estimated the eﬀect of labor market institutions on the unemployment
rates. By using the results in Sparrman (2011) we predict changes in unemployment caused
by labor market institutions, and subtract the predicted eﬀect from actual unemployment.
Second, labor market institutions and income inequality might be caused by a third factor,
the global economic development, aﬀecting both. We investigate our results using methods
described in Pesaran (2006).
The paper has the following structure: Chapter 2 presents econometric issues related to
the robustness check and the equation for wage inequality. The equation is equal to the
preferred speciﬁcation in Koeniger et al. (2007). Chapter 3 contains a brief overview of the
development and how the variables are assumed to aﬀect wage inequality. Chapter 4 contains
our main results and robustness checks. Chapter 6 summarizes and concludes.
2 Empirical speciﬁcation and other econometric issues
This section presents the main results and preferred empirical speciﬁcation of Koeniger et al.
(2007) which is also the foundation for our empirical speciﬁcation. This section also discusses
how to account for cross-sectional dependence for the 20 OECD countries in our panel.
2.1 The empirical model for wage inequality
Koeniger et al. (2007) investigates the relationship between labor market institutions and
wage inequality. The following model is estimated:
ln(
wh
wl
)it = θ0 + γ
′zit + θ′1vit + ϑ
′sit + di + dt + it(1)
Here wh/wl represent the 9/1-, 9/5- and 5/1-decile ratios of the gross degree of wage
distribution. zit is a vector characterizing the following labor market institutions; employ-
ment protection, the beneﬁt replacement ratio, beneﬁt duration, union density, coordination
in wage bargaining, the tax wedge and the minimum wage. The development and a priori
eﬀects of labour market institutions on wage inequality are explained in Section 3.
In order to isolate the eﬀects of the labor market institutions, we control for other ex-
ogenous factors that might aﬀect the wage diﬀerential, vit and sit. The vector, vit, controls
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for relative supply and demand for skilled and unskilled labor, which can aﬀect the relative
price of the two types of labor and therefore the wage diﬀerential. The vector consists of
the following variables: the natural logarithm of the skill endowment (measured by the ratio
of persons with tertiary education or higher to persons with lower degree of education), the
unemployment rate, and an interaction term between the two variables. The interaction
variable is a proxy of the relative unemployment rate of high- and low-skilled workers, and
implicitly assumes that this is proportional to the relative skill endowment. sit is a vector
of controls for trade and technology shocks, which can aﬀect the relative wages of high and
low-skilled labor through the processes mentioned in the introduction. Technology changes
are proxied by research and development (R&D) intensity in manufacturing sector. It is
measured by gross expenditures on R&D over gross value added in current prices. Trade is
measured by import intensity, which is imports relative to value added in manufacturing in
current prices. The di and dt control for country speciﬁc attributes and for calendar year
eﬀects. Finally, it, is the stochastic error term which is allowed to be heteroscedastic.
The results in Koeniger et al. (2007) are based on a feasible GLS ﬁxed eﬀects estimator,
with a variance-covariance matrix that assumes heteroscedasticity across countries. The
presence of autocorrelation in the error structure is neglected, but they illustrate that the
estimated coeﬃcients are almost identical when it is, and when it is not accounted for
autocorrelation.
Koeniger et al. (2007) ﬁnd a compressing eﬀect on the wage diﬀerential of stricter em-
ployment protection and higher union density, minimum wages, and unemployment beneﬁts
and duration. The coordination of wage setting and the tax wedge also had a compressing
eﬀect, but are not statistically signiﬁcant. They ﬁnd a decompressing relationship with the
skill endowment in the population and the wage diﬀerential, but no eﬀect of the demand
variables unemployment and the interaction term of unemployment and skill ratio. Moreover
they ﬁnd a decompressing association between the wage diﬀerential and import intensity, and
a compressing association with R&D intensity.
2.2 Robustness check
Cross-sectional dependence might bias the estimated coeﬃcients of the regressors in equa-
tion 1. For instance, if global business cycles have country speciﬁc eﬀects on both income
distribution and regressors, the estimated coeﬃcients will be biased even if time dummies
are included in the regression. Empirical support of that business cycles aﬀect income dis-
tribution is provided by for instance Lindquist (2004). Business cycles may also aﬀect the
magnitude of labor market variables, like the beneﬁt replacement rate and the tax wedge,
and the demand and supply of labor, measured by the unemployment rate and import in-
tensity. Therefore, cross-sectional dependence will imply that even if the estimated eﬀects
of tax wedge and beneﬁts on income distribution are signiﬁcant, the correlation might be
caused by a third factor moving both income distribution and the regressors. The impact of
cross-sectional dependence depends on the magnitude across cross-sections.
There exist several tests for cross-sectional dependence, when the number of units are
relatively high (as in our panel with 20 counties) and when there are no natural ordering
of the included countries. Breusch-Pagan Lagrange-Multiplier test is one method to test for
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cross-sectional dependence in FGLS models, see Greene (2000) for explanations. 1 However,
the cross-sectional dependence is tested using the correlation matrix for variables common
to all cross-sectional units (the number of observations used is reduced when the panel is
unbalanced). The reliability of the test is higher for panels where T > N , hence we excluded
some of the countries with short time series to investigate the error structure in a longer
time frame.
We also apply three other tests for cross-sectional dependence, i.e. Pesaran et al. (2008),
Friedman (1937) and Frees (1995).2 All three tests test the null-hypothesis of cross sectional
independence. These tests are best suited for panels with N > T . The tests are however only
available for ﬁxed eﬀects models. Pesaran’s test can be used with balanced and unbalanced
panels, while the other two use observations available for all cross-sectional units. Friedman
and Pesaran’s tests are sensitive to cross-sectional dependence where the signs of the corre-
lations are both negative and positive, which can cause the tests to be unreliable. This is the
case when common time eﬀects are included in the regression. The Pesaran CD test can be
conducted with an additional ”abs” function that calculates the average absolute correlation
of the residuals. A high value indicates the presence of cross-sectional dependence, even
when the test fails to reject the null hypothesis of independence because of altering signs in
the correlations. Free’s test is, however, not subject to this problem, and should be given
more weight if the Pesaran test with the “abs” option give contradicting results.
Pesaran (2006) has developed a method to account for cross sectional dependence. The
idea is to include cross-sectional averages of both the explained variable and regressors, such
that the diﬀerential eﬀects of unobserved common factors are eliminated. Westerlund and
Urbain (2011) give a theoretical argument for why the CCE - estimator performs better than
for instance the principal component estimator by Bai (2009) on a ﬁnite sample. In our panel,
most of the variation in the institutional variables comes from the between country variation,
cf. the absolute relative standard deviation in Table 1, column 7. Including the cross country
average with low within variation, will therefore mainly aﬀect the estimate of the country
speciﬁc coeﬃcient and not remove the cross-country dependence over time. Table 1 shows
that absolute relative standard deviation of beneﬁt duration, coordination and minimum
wage have relatively large within variation compared to the other institutional variables,
while all the control variables have large within variation.
3 Data
The theory of income inequality relates to skilled and unskilled labour. However, time series
for wage diﬀerentials by skill are not available for a suﬃciently long time period to capture
the eﬀect of labour market institutions. Income inequality is measured by the decile ratio of
yearly wages for men in full time positions.
This section gives an overview of the development of income-deciles for men in full-time
dependent positions and of the variables included in the empirical analysis; employment
protection, beneﬁt replacement ratio, beneﬁt duration, union density, coordination in wage
1The test is performed by using the command “xttest2” in Stata Baum (2001)
2The test are available with the command “xtcsd” in Stata-package.
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bargaining, the tax wedge and the minimum wage, immigration, R&D intensity and import
intensity.
Data are mainly from OECD Economic Outlook (2013). Coordination of wage setting
and the skill attainment that are from Visser (2011) and Barro and Lee (2010) respectively.
With exception of data for these two variables, the sources are the same as the ones used
in Koeniger et al. (2007). Data for the variables are provided for diﬀerent time periods for
diﬀerent countries, and results in a unbalanced panel. For a more thorough explanation of
sources and construction of variables see Appendix B.
3.1 Decile Ratios
The decile ratios are income in the 9th to the 1st decile (9/1-decile ratio), the 9th to the 5th
decile (9/5-decile ratio) and the 5th to the 1st decile (5/1-decile ratio). Three decile ratios
reﬂect the wage dispersion in diﬀerent parts of the wage distribution and male wage earners
are assumed to be directly aﬀected by labour market institutions.
Figure 1 shows the diﬀerent decile ratios for the countries in the sample period. The
9/1-decile ratio ranges from just under 2 to just above 5 in 2012. US is the country with
the highest level of wage inequality in 2012. Portugal comes in second with a 9/1-ratio of
around 4. Australia, Canada and the UK also have large diﬀerences in wages, with 9/1-decile
ratios above 3.5. The countries with the lowest 9/1-decile ratios in the sample are the Nordic
countries and Belgium.
The decile ratios have increased in most countries, but there are some exceptions, e.g.
France. The increase in the 9/1-decile ratio has mainly been driven by increasing wage
diﬀerential in the upper half of the distribution in Austria, Switzerland and New Zealand,
while the decline in the 9/1-decile ratio in France is driven by a decline in the wage disparity
in the lower half of the distribution.
3.2 Tax Wedge
The tax wedge measures the sum of the employment tax rate, the direct tax rate and the
indirect tax rate. It represents the gap between the cost of labor for the employer and the
purchasing power of the wage for the employee.
The tax wedge has been increasing in most OECD countries since the 1970s, cf. Appendix
Figure B7. It is particulary high in Sweden, almost 75 percent. The tax wedge is also fairly
high in countries like France, Finland, Denmark, and in Italy in the recent years. The tax
wedge is especially low in the US and Switzerland, where it is below 30 percent.
Increased tax wedge can aﬀect wage inequality by aﬀecting the claims for pre-tax wages.
A increase in the tax burden decreases the total surplus to be shared, and all wages are
reduced. Since income taxes tend to be progressive, it is reasonable to assume that the
surplus of those with higher wages are more aﬀected than those with lower wages. On the
other hand, a higher tax burden can increase the payoﬀ of non-taxable goods, and hence
lead so lower wage claims, in particular the top end of the wage distribution.
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3.3 Employment protection legislation
Employment protection legislation (EPL) measures mandatory restrictions regulating the
contractual relationship between employers and employees. Three diﬀerent measures of EPL
are used; EPL for temporary contracts, EPL for regular contracts and an overall measure
which is an average of the two.
EPL on regular contracts include a measure of the price associated with ﬁring workers
and regulations on how easy it is to ﬁre workers. Stricter regulations increases employment
protection. The measure includes features such as: deﬁnition of when a dismissal is unfair,
compensations following unfair dismissals, notiﬁcation process when dismissing workers and
severance pay.
The measure of EPL for temporary employment contracts cover the extent to which
temporary contracts are allowed and regulated. A stricter level of employment protection of
temporary contracts implies fewer allowances and more regulations of temporary positions.
The measure includes the maximum duration of ﬁxed term contract and contracts through
temporary agency work, and regulates the types of work where the use of temporary contracts
is permitted. The restrictions of number of renewals of temporary contracts, and number
of successive temporary contracts for the same position, and whether there are regulations
that ensure equal treatment for employees in temporary and regular positions.
The level of overall EPL was stable or increasing in all countries in the sample until
around 1990, then many countries eased the regulation of regular contracts, see Appendix
Figure B1. The Anglo Saxon countries stand out with a low level of strictness for the whole
time period. On a scale of 0-3, all of the Anglo Saxon countries have had a level of EPL below
1 since the 1970s. Today, the strictest level of overall EPL are in France, Spain, Portugal,
Norway and the Netherlands. Germany, Belgium and Sweden were among the countries with
strictest regulations in the 1980s and early 1990s, but have eased their regulations over the
past decades.
The development for separate measures of EPL for temporary and regular positions are
shown in Appendix, Figures B2 and B3. The regulations of temporary contracts have become
less strict in most countries, with some exceptions. In countries where the regulations were
very low to begin with, such as; Australia, Canada, Finland, the United Kingdom and the
United States, they have remained low. France and Ireland have only increased slightly in
strictness. The regulations of regular contracts are have been held more or less unchanged
in most countries, but has decreased in strictness in Portugal and Spain, where they were
very strict to begin with. They have increased marginally in strictness in most Anglo Saxon
countries, and after 2000 they have increased in Germany and been reduced in Austria. We
will come back to the eﬀects of the diﬀerent measures of EPL in Section 4.
3.4 Union density and coordination of wage setting
Union density equals the proportion of wage-earners who are unionized, while collective
bargaining coverage is a measure of the proportion of wage earners that are covered by
collective agreements.
The level of collective bargaining and union density varies a lot across OECD countries,
and there is not necessarily a connection between the sizes of the two. Union density has
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varied a lot within countries over time, see Appendix Figure B9. It has increased in countries
like Denmark, Finland and Belgium, while it has decreased in France, USA, Australia and
United Kingdom. Union density has declined in all the countries since the late 1980s/early
1990s, where they peaked. The collective bargaining coverage has been kept at a rather
steady level in most countries, but has decreased in Japan, United States and United King-
dom and increased in France and the Netherlands, cf. Appendix Figure B8.
Calmfors (1993) and Calmfors and J. (1988) explain that diﬀerent levels of coordination
might aﬀect the wage bargaining process diﬀerently. If the coordination index is at a very low
level, the unions have very little power, and act as if the labour market where characterized
by perfect competition. If the coordination level is very high, unions will take into account
that their wage claims also aﬀect the unemployment rate, and the wage claims will go down.
If the unions on the other hand is at a intermediate level, they can not aﬀect unemployment,
but have more bargain power than at the low level of coordination. The wage claims will
therefore increase, and can increase the wage distribution for the workers covered by the
union. Koeniger et al. (2007) explain the compressing eﬀect of the union density by the fact
that unions have more aggressive wage bargaining for low-skilled workers.
3.5 Unemployment beneﬁt duration and beneﬁt replacement rate
The beneﬁt replacement rate is a measure of how much unemployed workers are compensated
by the government the ﬁrst year after losing their job. The beneﬁt replacement rate after
year one of unemployment is also used to calculate the beneﬁt duration, which measures
the duration of beneﬁt replacement, and how the replacement rate develops relative to the
beneﬁt replacement rate in the ﬁrst year of unemployment.
The duration and size of unemployment beneﬁt replacement vary a lot among the coun-
tries in the OECD, see Figures B6 and B5. Some countries, like Australia, New Zealand and
the United Kingdom have a low level of beneﬁt replacement rate and a relatively high level
of beneﬁt duration, while it is the opposite in Canada. Beneﬁt replacement rates are high in
the Nordic countries, France, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Switzerland and relatively
lower in Germany, Japan and the Anglo Saxon countries, with exception of Ireland. The
duration of unemployment beneﬁts are as low as one year in Canada and Japan. Australia
and New Zealand give beneﬁts at a constant level every year of unemployment, but at a
relatively low rate.
The beneﬁt duration and the beneﬁt replacement rate represent the outside option to
being employed. An increase in unemployment beneﬁts would increase the reservation wage
of workers and therefore also the wage. Also in this case the relative beneﬁt replacement
rate would have to be relatively larger for the low-skilled for it to aﬀect the wage dispersion.
3.6 Minimum wage
Minimum wage is the lowest wage which is legally possible to pay an employee. It is common
to use the measure of minimum wage to median wage for countries with a minimum wage set
at the national level (Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004)), which is also done in this paper. The
value of the minimum wage variable is set to zero if a county has no regulation of minimum
wages.
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Figure B10 in appendix shows the level of minimum wage relative to median wage for
the countries in the panel. The ﬁgure shows that most counties have minimum wage at some
level or for some sectors. The ﬁgure shows that the size of the minimum wage relative to the
median wage varies a bit across the countries of interest. The minimum wage has decreased
in size relative to the median wage in most countries, except France and Japan, where it has
increased.
Earlier work on minimum wage by Brown (1999), DiNardo et al. (1996) and Lee (1999)
have concluded that the regulation of minimum wages reduce wage inequality. Normally, the
minimum wage are above the competitive wage of workers, and will therefore bring wages
to a higher level. At the same time are wages of high skilled workers not directly aﬀected.
Workers that are aﬀected by minimum wages tend to be young workers below 24 and workers
over 24 with few years of education (Addison and Blackburn, 1999). However, our data show
that minimum wages to medium wages have decreased over time, this reduction has therefore
contributed to increase wage inequality over time. A minimum wage could also increase wage
inequality if the job-destruction rate increases and reduces labor market tightness for the
low skilled workers.
3.7 Skill endowment
The skill ratio of the working population (15-74) is measured by the share of the population
in each country with tertiary education or higher, to the share of the population with a lower
degree of education.
Relative skill endowment has had a prominent increase in all the countries in the sample
over the past decades, especially in countries like Australia, Canada and the US, which have
the highest levels today, cf. Appendix Figure B12. The skill endowment is still relatively
low in countries like Italy and Portugal and fairly low in Austria and Switzerland.
The skill-attainment can aﬀect the wage dispersion through diﬀerent channels. Either
through a compositional eﬀect if wages are higher for high-skilled workers, and the number
of high-skilled workers increase, the dispersion will increase. cf. Blau and Kahn (2001)
and Devroye and Freeman (2002). The skill-attainment can also aﬀect the wage dispersion
through the price of skilled labor, if an increase in skill-attainment lowers the price of high-
skilled workers and reduces income dispersion, cf. Goldin and Katz (2007).
3.8 Immigration
Immigration is measured as net immigration to the population in age (15-74). The migration
ﬂows into OECD countries have varied over the sample period, but increased until 2008
in most OECD countries. In the following years immigration declined as a result of the
recession, cf. Appendix Figure B15. If skill distribution of immigrants are diﬀerent from the
native population. this may aﬀect the wage distribution. We will return to the eﬀects of
immigration on the wage dispersion in Section 4.
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3.9 Trade and Technology
Changes in international trade and technology are approximated by the import intensity, the
ratio of imports over value added, and the research and development intensity, the ratio of
R&D expenditure over value added, both for the manufacturing sector, all in current prices.
Over the past decades, the import intensity has been overall increasing in all countries,
except for Ireland, where it has decreased, see Figure B13. Figure B14, also show that R&D
intensity has increased in all, but one country, over the de past decades. R&D fell in UK
but from a very high level.
An increase in international trade is thought to aﬀect the relative wages of high- and low-
skilled workers through an increase in the relative demand for high-skilled labor. Technologi-
cal development is thought to capture the eﬀect of the skill-biased technological change that,
supposedly, contributed to making skilled labor relatively more productive and increased rel-
ative demand and the relative wages for for this type of labor.
3.10 Unemployment Rate
An increase in the unemployment rate reduces the wage pressure, and the eﬀect on the
wage dispersion depend on the composition of high- and low-skilled workers among the
unemployed.
The unemployment rates have been increasing in most countries towards the beginning
of the 2000s, and the dispersion between the countries have also increased, cf. Figure B11.
The unemployment rates decreased in the period from 2000 and prior to the ﬁnancial crisis.
The unemployment rates have then increased for most countries in the sample, one exception
is Norway.
The responsiveness of wages to the level of unemployment can also diﬀer for diﬀerent
groups in the labor market. de Galdeano and Turunen (2005) look at the elasticity of real
wages with respect to local unemployment in the EU. They ﬁnd that the wage elasticity
is higher in the lower part of the distribution, and that wages in the public sector are
especially rigid. Blanchﬂower (1991) suggests that this is also the case for wages of unionized
workers. This could cause the wages in the middle of the distribution to be less aﬀected by
unemployment than the upper and lower half of the distribution, leading to higher wage
dispersion in the lower half and lower wage dispersion in the upper half.
4 Labour market institutions and income inequality
The link between institutions and income inequality might change over time. Estimating
Equation 1 on the same sample period as Koeniger et al. (2007), 1973-1998, and then on
an extended time period, 1973-2011, reveal that labour market institutions still are impor-
tant in explaining wage diﬀerentials between OECD countries, but some of the eﬀects are
numerically smaller than previously reported. In this section, we investigate two poten-
tial explanations, separate measures for employment protection on regular and temporary
contracts and surge in immigration.
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4.1 The overall link between labour market institutions and wage
inequality
The link between labour market institutions and wage inequality can change with time. We
have therefore ﬁrst replicated the models for the 9/1-, 9/5- and 5/1- decile ratios in Koeniger
et al. (2007), Table 2, column 1, 3 and 4, with revised data, but by using the original time
series for coordination and skill due to data limitations, see Appendix B for a comprehensive
review. Then, the coordination and skill variable are replaced with new time series to form a
new baseline scenario before we extended the data set. We are interested in the time eﬀects
and the results from the revised and the baseline scenario are hence relegated to Appendix
A.
This section evaluates the preferred econometric model in Koeniger et al. (2007) using
a revised and extended data set. The extended dataset covers the time period 1973-2011,
which includes the additional years from 1998-2011 compared to Koeniger et al. (2007).
The data set also has more cross country variation since it includes 9 additional OECD
countries; Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Norway, New Zealand, Switzerland, Ireland, Portugal
and Spain, in addition to Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the
Netherlands, Sweden, the UK and the US.
Table 2, column (1), shows the results of the regression of the preferred econometric
speciﬁcation in Koeniger et al. (2007) on our dataset. All institutional variables have com-
pressing eﬀects on the 9/1-decile ratio, as in the original regression. With the exception of
the union density and beneﬁt duration, they are all signiﬁcant.
The estimated coeﬃcient of employment protection legislation is considerably smaller
than in Koeniger et al. (2007), which is both due to data revision cf. Figure A1 and to the
extension of the data set, see Figure 2. The lower estimated eﬀect on the extended data set
might be due to the opposing eﬀects of employment protection for temporary and regularly
contracts, which are discussed in the next section. The estimated coeﬃcient of the tax wedge
has increased, while the estimated coeﬃcient of beneﬁt replacement rate, coordination and
minimum wage are close to those in Koeniger et al. (2007).
The eﬀect on the upper and the lower part of the income distribution, the 9/5-decile
ratio and 5/1-Decile ratio in Table 2, columns (2) and (3), disentangles the eﬀect of labor
market institutions on two separate parts of the income distribution. The table shows
that employment protection, beneﬁt replacement rate, tax rate, coordination and minimum
wage compress both the lower and upper part of the income distribution, but the eﬀect of
coordination and minimum wage are only signiﬁcant on the upper part. The latter result
could be due to how the minimum wage is measured, i.e. minimum wage over median wage.
Union density has a compressing eﬀect on the upper part of the income distribution, and an
increasing, but insigniﬁcant eﬀect, on the lower part. The eﬀect of beneﬁt duration is not
signiﬁcant on either the upper or lower part of the income distribution.
The quantitative implications of the results in Table 2 are presented in Table 3. Panel A
presents the change in the 9/1-decile ratio, of one standard deviation increase in the rigidity
of the measures of the institutional variables. Table 3, Panel B, presents the change in the
9/1-decile ratio associated with an increase in institutions from the minimum levels of rigidity
to the maximum levels of rigidity. A change from minimum rigidity to maximum rigidity is
associated with a change in the 9/1-decile ratio of around 6% for the coordination of wage
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setting and an increase in the minimum wage from non-existing to 67% of the median wage,
7.7% of a change of the union density from 7% to 84%, 21% decrease for a rise in the tax
wedge from 20% to 75%. An increase in the measure of overall EPL is associated with a
decrease in the 9/1-decile ratio of 15.7%.
The results from the extended model in Table 2 imply that the largest eﬀect of a standard
deviation change comes from the tax wedge which is associated with a 5.4 decline in the 9/1-
decile ratio from a change of a standard deviation of 13,9 percentage points in the tax wedge.
A one standard deviation in the strictness of the overall EPL measure of 0.6 on a scale from
1-3, is associated with a 4.6% decline in the 9/1-decile ratio. A standard deviation change in
the measures of unemployment protection is associated with around 3% decline in the 9/1-
decile ratio, while the one standard deviation change in the minimum wage, the coordination
of wage setting and the union density are associated with a decline in the 9/1-decile ratio of
around 2%.
A more intuitive way of presenting the results, is to compare how the growth in income
inequality would change if a country changed their institutions from strict to less strict labor
market institutions. For instance, how would income inequality in Scandinavia change if
their institutions went from highly regulated to unregulated, such as the average level of the
UK and US? Our results show that the average growth in inequality in Scandinavia would
increase by 42 percent if labor market institutions changed from the average level in 2011 to
the average level in UK and US.
The controls for relative supply and demand conditions for labor; the unemployment rate,
the skill attainment and the interaction term between have opposing eﬀects on the extended
data set. The unemployment rate has a compressing eﬀect on the 9/1-decile ratio, and the
eﬀect is signiﬁcant at a 5 percent level. As in the original paper, the eﬀect on the 9/5 and
5/1-decile ratios in column (2) and (3) are in opposite directions, but only signiﬁcant on the
upper half of the distribution. The interaction between unemployment and skill is a proxy for
unemployed high skilled workers. The result show a decompressing eﬀect on the upper part
of the wage distribution and increased wage dispersion in the lower part, which might imply
that the medium wage has changed. As in the baseline scenario, skills has a compressing
eﬀect on the 9/1-decile ratio. In the original paper it had an increasing eﬀect, but it turned
negative when the US was omitted after 1990. Using the extended data set lends support to
the change in direction of the coeﬃcient of the skill attainment in the replication, indicating
that higher skill attainment decreases wage dispersion. However, the results do not indicate
that the upper part of the wage distribution, 9/5-Decile ratio, is more compressed, since the
coeﬃcient is close to zero and not signiﬁcant, but the eﬀect on the lower part of the wage
distribution, the 5/1-Decile ratio, is negative and signiﬁcant, cf. Table 2 column (2) and
(3). The result on the upper part of the distribution is reasonable since the eﬀects of skill
attainment can aﬀect the wage distribution through diﬀerent channels. One channel is that
the price of skilled labor decreases because the supply of skill increases. Another channel, is
that more high skilled workers with higher wages increase wage dispersion (to some degree),
c.f. Blau and Kahn (2001) and Devroye and Freeman (2002)).
The controls for trade and technology both have negative coeﬃcients and are signiﬁcant
for all parts of the wage distribution. The coeﬃcient of the trade proxy was positive in the
original paper and in the baseline scenario, but turned from positive to negative using the
extended dataset. However, a recent article by Autor et al. (2013), ﬁnd that manufactur-
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ing employment decreased more in districts where the production traditionally consisted of
typical Chinese export products in the US. In sum, they ﬁnd that 25 percent of the reduc-
tion in manufacturing employment from 1990 to 2007 is due to imports from China, and
there are no sign of increased production of other goods in these districts. They also ﬁnd
that even if wages in manufacturing sector are unaﬀected by the negative shock of higher
imports, wages outside manufacturing sector were negatively aﬀected. This implies that
workers form manufacturing sector seek jobs outside this sector and creates a downward
pressure on wages in the non-manufacturing sector and contributes to compressing the wage
dispersion as our results are implying. The negative eﬀect of R&D ﬁts less well with the
theories of the skill-biased technological change and the Stolper-Samueson theorem. From
theory, R&D is assumed to increase relative productivity in skill-intensive sector, and hence
increase the wage dispersion. On the other hand the results are in line with the original
paper, and might support the conclusions of that R&D it is not a good proxy for the stock
of technology, being both a stock and ﬂow variable.
The explanatory power of the extended regression on the 9/1-decile ratio in column 1,
Table 2, is compared with a regression with only the time and country dummies. As in the
original regression in Koeniger et al. (2007), the measure of ﬁt, R2, is lower with only time
and country dummies and equal to 0.72, while the model with institutional variables in Table
2 column 1 where equal to 0.94. The higher level indicates that including the institutional
variables substantially improve the ﬁt.
In the lower part of Table 2 we present the results of the test for heteroscedasticity
described in Section 2. The test result in Table 2, model 1, clearly rejects the null hypothesis
of homoscedasticity and the remaining results allows residuals to be heteroscedastic.
4.2 Impact on income inequality of employment protection for
temporary and regular contracts
Our investigation so far, has used a measure of overall EPL. However, the underlying vari-
ables employment protection of regularly and temporary contracts show a diverging devel-
opment over time. EPL for regular contracts has been more or less unchanged at a relatively
high level, while EPL for temporary positions has been eased to stimulate job creation and
ﬂexibility in the labor market. In addition, the number of people in temporary positions has
increased in many countries (see Appendix Figure B4).
Previous work on separate measures for employment protection for temporary and regular
contracts have revealed diﬀerent eﬀects on employment to population rates, cf. Nunziata
and Staﬀolani (2007). Increased employment shares might aﬀect the wage distribution, since
marginal workers with lower productivity enters the labor market. In addition, Blanchard
and Landier (2002) found that reforms of regulations of employment protection for temporary
contracts in the short run have increased the share of employees in temporary positions. If
this group has lower bargaining power, this can aﬀect the wage distribution.
However separate measures of EPL for temporary and regular contracts exist only after
1985, causing the time series to become shorter and some institutional variables may have
lost signiﬁcance. Table 5, column (4) contains the results with overall EPL for the same
time period. The R2 of the results in the 1st and the 4th column are both 0.96, so the ﬁt of
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the model with separate measures of EPL is the same.
Table 5, column (1) to (3), shows the estimated results of this speciﬁcation with separate
measures of EPL for regular and temporary contracts. The results in Table 5 show that
the eﬀects of the overall measure of EPL used previously, disguises the ambiguous eﬀects
of the two measures of EPL for regular and temporary positions. The part of employment
protection that covers regular contracts increases the diﬀerences between the 9th and the
1st decile, while EPL concerning temporary contracts compresses the wage distribution.
The results indicate that the reforms, where EPL for regular contracts were held more or
less unchanged, while EPL for temporary contracts was eased to stimulate job creation,
have contributed to a greater division of labor markets. Some workers have stable regular
positions with a high degree of employment protection and high wages, while others have
low-paid temporary jobs.
Our ﬁndings are in line with previous empirical studies of labor market institutions on
unemployment. Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (2002) and Blanchard and Landier (2002) have
found that reforms increased the share of employees in temporary positions, but did not
have a clear long term eﬀects on unemployment. Blanchard and Landier (2002) also suggest
that the types of positions that were oﬀered in the labor marked were changed to adjust to
these reforms, and that ﬁrms now create routine, lower productivity jobs where workers can
easily be replaced with temporary contracts.
One explanation of our ﬁndings are proposed by Autor (2003). He ﬁnds that EPL for
regular contracts increases the incentives to invest more in training of employees in regular
positions, leading to accumulation of ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital which can increase both
productivity and wages. On the other hand, workers with temporary contracts have little
possibility for advancement. Increased investment in one type of contract will contribute to
increase the within group wage dispersion in both the upper and lower part of the income
groups. It will also increase the between group wage dispersion between high and low-skilled
workers if a disproportionate share of low-skilled workers end up in the temporary positions
(cf. Barbieri (2009)). Nunziata and Staﬀolani (2007) also ﬁnd that the eﬀect of EPL for
temporary contracts on the share of employees in temporary contacts, increases with the
strictness of EPL for regular contracts.
The quantitative implications of the eﬀect of the diﬀerent aspects of EPL are quite large.
According to the results from Table 3, one standard deviation change in the measure of EPL
for regular contracts leads to a change in the 9/1-decile ratio of over 6%, while the eﬀect
of a one standard deviation increase in the rigidity of the measure of EPL for temporary
contracts reduces it by 2.57%.
The quantitative implications of the measures of EPL for temporary and regular positions
are larger if we consider a change from the minimum level to the maximum level of rigidity,
cf. Table 3, panel B. An increase in the rigidity of EPL for regular positions from 0.17 like
in the US since the mid 1980s to 4.17 like in Portugal in the 2000s, on a scale from 1-6,
is associated with an increase in the size of the 9/1-decile ratio of 30.7%, while an increase
in the rigidity of EPL for temporary positions from 0.25 which is common in Anglo Saxon
countries to 5.38, the level in Italy until 1996, is associated with an decline in the 9/1-decile
ratio of 10.46%. Few countries have seen a change in institutions of the magnitudes described
here, so the content of Panel B should be interpreted with even more care than Panel A.
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4.3 Impact on income inequality of changes in immigration
The increased level of immigration has become a popular explanation for the growth in
wage dispersion in the recent years. The eﬀect of immigration depends on the skill-level of
immigrants and natives and the substitutability at diﬀerent skill-levels of the two groups. If
the within group inequality in the immigrant population is larger than the level of inequality
in the native population, the relative growth of the immigrant population will lead to a
more unequal overall wage dispersion. Immigration can also aﬀect the wages of natives at
the same skill-level through substitution.
The results from the analysis where immigration as a share of total population is included
in equation 1, are presented in Table 6. The results show that immigration has a signiﬁcant
diverging eﬀect on the 9/1- and 5/1-decile ratio. The eﬀect on the 9/5-decile ratio is also
decompressing, but not signiﬁcant, and much smaller than the eﬀect on the 9/1- and 5/1-
decile ratios, cf. Table 6 columns (1) to (3). This indicates that more immigrants contribute
most to increasing the wage dispersion in the lower half of the wage distribution. The
inclusion of immigration has little eﬀect on coeﬃcients of the other variables in the regression.
The eﬀect on the lower half of the distribution could be due to, either, that immigrant
workers on average have lower wages than native workers, causing the between group in-
equality between native and immigrant workers to increase, or because immigrant workers
are relatively better substitutes for low-skilled workers than high skilled workers, and hence
causes the wages for all low-skilled workers to decrease.
Bru¨cker and Jahn (2011) have looked at the wage and employment eﬀects of immigra-
tion in Germany, a country with a rigid labor market. They ﬁnd evidence that native and
immigrant workers are imperfect substitutes at the same skill-level. They ﬁnd that native
workers tend to beneﬁt from immigration in terms of higher wages and lower risk of unem-
ployment, but foreign workers experience a major impact from immigration at their given
skill and experience level. It is also studied by Card (2009), who looks at the connection be-
tween immigration and inequality in the US, where low-skilled immigrant from Mexico and
Central-America are thought to have contributed to an increase in the skill-diﬀerential and
lower the wages for low-skilled native born through substitution. The immigrant population
in the US is concentrated in the upper and lower tails of the skill-distribution. Similarly to
Bru¨cker and Jahn (2011), Card (2009) ﬁnds that immigration had little impact on the wages
of the native born, but that the overall impact is clearly contributing to increasing the level
of inequality. He estimates that about ﬁve percent of the rise in overall wage inequality in
the US between 1980 and 2000 can be explained by immigration. However, Bratsberg and
Raaum (2012) show that higher immigrant employment shares also reduces wage growth
of native construction workers. The empirical analysis is conducted using Norwegian micro
data and licensing requirements to achieve exogenous variation in immigrant employment
across trades.
We ﬁnd that one standard deviation change in immigration of 2.4% is associated with
an increase in the 9/1-decile ratio of 1.36%, cf. Table 3.
From a policy perspective, it could be interesting to investigate if minimum wages can
prevent the lowest wages from falling when immigration increases. This has led us to inves-
tigate the diﬀerences between countries with and without minimum wages. The results for
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countries with and without minimum wages on the 9/1-decile ratio are shown in Table 6 3,
and show that the eﬀect on wage dispersion is larger if a country also has minimum wages,
but it is not signiﬁcant. The eﬀect of immigration on the lower part of the wage distribution
increases the distribution, but the eﬀect is dampened in countries with minimum wages, al-
though not signiﬁcantly. The small estimated eﬀects of minimum wages might be due to the
fact that minimum wages have been kept at a low level or been decreasing in the estimation
period.
However, we should consider the results of immigration as a ﬁrst attempt to capture
the eﬀects of immigration on income inequality, as small income diﬀerences could increase
immigration of low skilled workers, since the skill premia is relatively high. While high
income diﬀerences could imply high immigration of high skilled workers and dampen the
eﬀect.
5 Robustness
We perform two types of robustness checks on the aggregate eﬀects of labour market insti-
tutions. First, we study how robust the estimated eﬀects of labour market institution are
to cross-sectional dependence. Second, we investigate how reliable our are if we account for
that part of the changes in unemployment is due to changes in labour market institutions.
5.1 Cross-sectional dependence
The tests for cross-sectional dependence are presented in the lower part of Table 2. All tests
rejects the null hypothesis of cross-sectional independence. As mentioned in Section 2, the
diﬀerent tests are developed for diﬀerent compositions of time- and cross-sectional dimen-
sions. We have therefore adjusted the sample size according to the diﬀerent speciﬁcations.
The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (LM) - test is conducted on 10 countries, which in-
sures a suﬃciently long series of observations common to all cross-sectional units. The time
dimension is equal to 16. The test statistic is equal to 144 with degrees of freedom equal to
45. The Friedman and Frees’ tests are also based on 10 countries and the test statistics are
respectively equal to 3.53 and 0.9. The Pesaran test does not have the same restrictions in
the T-dimension as the other tests. It is hence performed on 17 countries, has a test statistic
equal to -2.99, and shows a fairly high value of average absolute correlation of residuals equal
to 0.32.
We control for cross-sectional dependence in Table 2, column 4, by including the cross-
sectional average of the dependent variable, beneﬁt duration, and all the control variables
except for import intensity. There is no sign of 1. or 2. order autocorrelation when the
averages are included in the CCEP model. The results show that employment protection,
beneﬁt replacement ratio, tax wedge, coordination and minimum wage, have a signiﬁcant
compressing eﬀect on the 9/1-decile ratio, and union density is negative, but not signiﬁcant.
With exception of the eﬀect of minimum wage, the estimated eﬀects are smaller than the
GLS-estimates in column 1. On the other hand, all the control variables have lost signiﬁcance.
3The other results of immigration on the other parts of the wage distribution are available on request.
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The results are not surprising as these variables are more directly aﬀected by global changes
in the world economy.
The estimated eﬀects of EPL of temporary and regular contracts remain even if we control
for cross-sectional dependence by including the average of the 9/1-decile ratio or averages of
all signiﬁcant explanatory variables as described in Section 2. The results are available on
request.
5.2 Indirect eﬀects of the labor market institutions
According to the “Krugman Hypothesis”, unemployment increases with the rigidity of la-
bor market institutions. Many studies have found this to be true. Nickell et al. (2005)
and Sparrman (2011) ﬁnd that unemployment is increasing in EPL, unemployment bene-
ﬁt replacement ratio, while an interaction of the coordination and union density decrease
unemployment. It is therefore likely that some of the eﬀect of the institutional variables
on the wage diﬀerential is picked up in the coeﬃcient of the unemployment rate, because
some of the eﬀects of the institutional variables aﬀect the wage dispersion indirectly through
unemployment.
The unemployment rate variable in the baseline model is replaced by two variables. One
which should account for the indirect eﬀect of labor market institutions on unemployment
and the second which should be unaﬀected by labor market institutions. The new variable
for the development in the unemployment rate caused by labor market institutions is based
on the estimated coeﬃcients of the institutional variables on the unemployment rate in
Sparrman (2011) Table (12). The second variable; the share of unemployment which is
assumed not to be correlated with institutional variables consists of the actual unemployment
rate subtracted by the predicted unemployment rate.
The compressing eﬀect of labor market institutions on wage inequality are even larger
when the eﬀect of labor market institutions through the unemployment rate is accounted
for, cf. Table 4. The unemployment rate without labor market institutions has a signiﬁcant
compressing eﬀect on the upper part of the wage distribution, while it signiﬁcantly increases
the lower part of the wage distribution
6 Conclusion
Between 1980 and 2000 most countries in the OECD carried out neo-liberal regulatory re-
forms that made labor markets more ﬂexible. These reforms included easing of employment
protection legislations, lowering of the relative minimum wage, weakening of union power,
and some also reduced unemployment beneﬁts. Most of these regulatory changes were as-
sociated with lower unemployment rates, but also higher wage disparity, cf. Koeniger et al.
(2007). The Temporary Agency Work Directive in the EU has actualized the eﬀects of labour
market institutions as this directive implies more restrictions on employment protection of
temporary positions.
The analysis in this paper is based on the empirical speciﬁcation in Koeniger et al. (2007)
but is conducted on a twice as large dataset. The data set covers 20 OECD countries from
1973 to 2011. The results give empirical support to the view that labor market institutions
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increases wage inequality. For example, our data set contains all of the Scandinavian coun-
tries which traditionally have had small income diﬀerences, and our results suggest that the
growth in income inequality in the Scandinavian countries would increase by more than 40
percent if their institutions become like the average level of the UK and US. The detailed
results show that employment protection legislation, the beneﬁt replacement rate, the un-
employment beneﬁt duration, the tax wedge, the minimum wage and the coordination of
wage setting all have a signiﬁcant compressing eﬀect on the 9/1-decile ratio. Union density
also has a compressing eﬀect, but it is only signiﬁcant on the 9/5-decile ratio.
Recently, in Europe, the introduction of the TWA directive has raised a discussion of how
regulations on temporary and regularly contracts aﬀect the economy. We replace the overall
measure for employment protection in the empirical analysis with variables for temporary
and regular contracts, and the results show that these measures have signiﬁcant opposite
eﬀects on wage distribution. Employment protection for temporary contracts has a com-
pressing eﬀect on the wage diﬀerential, while employment protection for regular contracts
has contributed to increasing the wage diﬀerential. This implies that easing the restrictions
on employment protection for temporary positions in order to stimulate job creation has lead
to an increase in wage dispersion. In combination with previous results, which have found
that less strict employment protection only increased the share of temporary workers, but
did not have any long lasting eﬀects on unemployment, Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (2002) and
Blanchard and Landier (2002) may imply a division of the labor market. The separate eﬀects
of employment protection for regular and temporary contracts, are interesting in forecasting
the eﬀect of Temporary Agency Work Directive in the EU. The new directive does to some
extent reverse the features of the neo-liberal labor market reforms that took place in the 80s
and 90s, where employment protection concerning temporary positions where deregulated.
The new directive gives employees in temporary contracts and employees working through
agencies equal treatment as employees in regular contracts with similar work, and our results
suggest that wage inequality will be considerable reduced with this regualtion.
We also extend the analysis in another direction by looking at the eﬀect of immigra-
tion. The results show that higher immigration in the lower part of the wage distribution
increases wage inequality, but the eﬀect is dampened in countries with minimum wages.
The dampened eﬀect, however, is not signiﬁcant. The small estimated eﬀects of minimum
wages might be due to the fact that minimum wages have been kept at a low level or been
decreasing in the estimation period. It would be interesting to look more closely at the eﬀect
of institutions on the employment among immigrants. While labor market institutions have
a compressing eﬀect on the wages of employed workers, many of the institutional variables
have an increasing eﬀect on unemployment for immigrants. Labor market institutions can
give immigrants better conditions in the labor market, but at the same time make it harder
for immigrants to enter the labor market. This topic is left for the future.
We also perform some robustness checks to our results achieved on the long sample pe-
riod. First, theoretical literature has pointed out that labour market institutions also aﬀect
unemployment, see Pissarides (2000) and Layard et al. (1991). By using the results in Spar-
rman (2011) we predict changes in unemployment caused by labor market institutions, and
subtract the predicted eﬀect from actual unemployment. The results show that institutions
have an additional eﬀect on the wage diﬀerential through the eﬀect on unemployment rate.
In addition, our results and the results in Koeniger et al. (2007) could be due to a common
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economic development and hence not be robust to account for cross-sectional dependence.
Our results are tested using methods in Pesaran (2006) and we ﬁnd that six out of seven
labour market institutions still have a compressing impact on inequality. The eﬀect of union
density is not signiﬁcant and the eﬀect of beneﬁt duration has changed sign. While the
separate and opposing eﬀects of employment protection of temporary and regular contracts
are unaﬀected by applying this method.
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Figure 1: Development of Decile Ratios
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Figure 2: The estimated coeﬃcients from Table A and Table 2. The relative size is equal to
one if the estimated coeﬃcients from the two tables are equal.
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Table 1: Relative standard deviations for the within and between variation. Sample period:
1973-2011
Variable Mean Std. Dev Min Max Rel. Std. Dev Obs
9/1-decile ratio overall 1.07 0.21 0.67 1.64 0.20 N = 465
between 0.20 0.79 1.47 0.19 n = 20
within 0.08 0.81 1.27 0.08 T = 23.25
Employment protection overall 1.21 0.63 0.13 2.51 0.52 N = 798
between 0.62 0.13 2.27 0.51 n = 20
within 0.21 0.51 1.64 0.17 T = 39.9
Beneﬁt replacement ratio overall 0.47 0.20 0.00 0.89 0.42 N = 820
between 0.17 0.23 0.78 0.36 n = 20
within 0.11 -0.05 0.82 0.23 T = 41
Beneﬁt duration overall 0.47 0.33 0.00 1.04 0.69 N = 818
between 0.31 0.00 1.02 0.65 n = 20
within 0.13 -0.23 0.83 0.27 T = 40.9
Tax wedge overall 0.46 0.13 0.19 0.75 0.29 N = 764
between 0.13 0.22 0.67 0.27 n = 20
within 0.05 0.24 0.59 0.10 T = 38.2
Coordination overall 3.21 1.31 1.00 5.00 0.41 N = 753
between 0.99 1.10 4.26 0.31 n = 20
within 0.89 0.55 7.10 0.28 T = 37.65
Union density overall 0.40 0.20 0.08 0.84 0.50 N = 751
between 0.19 0.13 0.78 0.48 n = 20
within 0.08 0.20 0.69 0.19 T = 37.55
Minimum wage overall 0.24 0.25 0.00 0.70 1.07 N = 820
between 0.22 0.00 0.54 0.94 n = 20
within 0.13 -0.30 0.76 0.55 T = 41
log(Unempl. rate) overall 1.69 0.77 -5.81 3.23 0.45 N = 820
between 0.51 0.15 2.41 0.30 n = 20
within 0.58 -4.26 3.04 0.34 T = 41
log(Skill Ratio) overall -1.69 0.75 -3.80 0.07 0.45 N = 763
between 0.62 -2.78 -0.38 0.37 n = 20
within 0.45 -2.86 -0.82 0.26 T = 38.15
log(Skill)*log(Unempl. rate) overall -2.76 1.89 -7.23 12.90 0.69 N = 763
between 1.52 -5.63 0.23 0.55 n = 20
within 1.18 -5.40 9.91 0.43 T = 38.15
Import intensity overall 0.13 0.07 0.01 0.56 0.58 N = 735
between 0.06 0.02 0.30 0.49 n = 20
within 0.04 -0.03 0.38 0.32 T = 36.75
R&D overall 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.16 0.73 N = 649
between 0.03 0.00 0.10 0.65 n = 20
within 0.02 0.01 0.15 0.33 T = 32.45
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Table 2: Labour market institutions and wage inequality on the period 1973-2011.
GLS CCEP
(1) (2) (3) (4)
9/1-Decile Ratio 9/5-Decile Ratio 5/1-Decile Ratio 9/1-Decile Ratio
Coef./se p-value Coef./se p-value Coef./se p-value Coef./se p-value
Institutional variables: ref. ref. ref. ref.
Employment Protection Legislation(EPL) -0.056∗∗ 0.00 -0.019∗ 0.04 -0.052∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.038∗ 0.04
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Beneﬁt Replacement Rate -0.157∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.080∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.114∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.119∗∗ 0.01
(0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05)
Beneﬁt Duration -0.041 0.09 0.008 0.58 -0.031 0.09 0.011 0.70
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03)
Tax Wedge -0.431∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.111∗ 0.04 -0.189∗∗ 0.00 -0.207∗ 0.04
(0.09) (0.05) (0.06) (0.10)
Coordination of Wage Setting -0.011∗∗ 0.00 -0.009∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.004 0.08 -0.006∗ 0.02
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Union Density -0.119 0.08 -0.153∗∗∗ 0.00 0.017 0.70 -0.015 0.88
(0.07) (0.04) (0.04) (0.10)
Minimum Wage -0.080∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.032∗ 0.02 -0.026 0.10 -0.104∗∗∗ 0.00
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Supply and demand conditions: ref. ref. ref. ref.
Ln(Skill Ratio) -0.119∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.010 0.59 -0.130∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.062 0.10
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
Ln(Unemployment Rate) -0.050∗ 0.03 -0.041∗∗ 0.00 0.008 0.58 -0.026 0.21
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Ln(Unemploymentrate)*Ln(Skill Ratio) 0.005 0.74 -0.011 0.17 0.028∗∗ 0.00 0.001 0.97
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Trade and Technology: ref. ref. ref. ref.
Import Intensity -0.466∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.221∗∗ 0.00 -0.279∗∗∗ 0.00 0.172 0.32
(0.13) (0.08) (0.06) (0.17)
R&D Intensity -0.972∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.486∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.205 0.14 0.057 0.80
(0.20) (0.11) (0.14) (0.22)
Observations 421 421 424 421
Number of Countries 20 20 20 20
Avg years pr country 21.1 21.1 21.2 21.1
F-test of all the exogenous variables 357.94 (0.00) 252.33 (0.00) 236.03 (0.00) 74.60 (0.00)
F-test of institutional variables 96.37 (0.00) 88.42 (0.00) 75.73 (0.00) 58.60 (0.00)
F-test of non-institutional variables 168.45 (0.00) 85.50 (0.00) 124.87 (0.00) 23.10 (0.00)
R2 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.61
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
a) All estimations include dummies for countries and years and assumes country-level heteroscedasticity.
b) Numbers in parenthesis are standard deviations.
Variables:
The Beneﬁt Replacement Ratio, Union Density, Minimum Wage, Import Intensity, R&D Intensity and Tax Wedge are proportions
with range (0-1), Beneﬁt Duration has a range (0-1.1) EPL Overall ranges (0-3) and Coordination ranges (1-5).
Tests :
Modiﬁed Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity in cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression model,
H0: σi2 = σ2 for all i, χ2(20) = 2543174.8 and p-value = 0.
Breush-Pagan test χ2(45) = 149.31 and p-value is equal to = 0.00.
Pesaran’s test of cross sectional independence = -2.99 and p-value equal to 0 .00. The average absolute value of the oﬀ-diagonal elements = 0.32
Friedman’s test of cross sectional independence = 3.53 and p-value equal to 0 .94
Frees’ test of cross sectional independence = .89 and critical value for α = 0.01 is equal to 0.31
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Table 3: Quantitative implications of changes in the institutional variables. Change in
log(w90/w10)
Panel A EPL Beneﬁt Beneﬁt Tax Coord Union Min Immigration EPL EPL
One Std.dev Change Overall Rep. Rate Duration Wedge Density Wage Temp. Reg.
Coeﬃcients from:
Table 2, Baseline model -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.06 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02
Table 5, EPL temp. and reg. -0.02 0.00 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.01
Table 6, Immigration -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.07 -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 0.02
Panel B
Change from Min to Max
Coeﬃcients from:
Table 2, Baseline model -0.11 -0.14 -0.04 -0.23 -0.04 -0.09 -0.05
Table 5, EPL temp. and reg. -0.08 0.01 -0.14 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 -0.07 0.05
Table 6, Immigration -0.14 -0.14 -0.07 -0.27 -0.04 -0.13 -0.06 0.12
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Table 4: Indirect eﬀects of labour market institutions via unemployment on wage inequality.
Estimation Period 1973-2011
(1) (2) (3)
9/1-Decile Ratio 9/5-Decile Ratio 5/1-Decile Ratio
Coef./se p-value Coef./se p-value Coef./se p-value
Institutional variables:
Employment Protection Legislation(EPL) -0.072∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.021∗ 0.03 -0.065∗∗∗ 0.00
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Beneﬁt Replacement Rate -0.263∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.141∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.167∗∗∗ 0.00
(0.05) (0.03) (0.04)
Beneﬁt Duration -0.052 0.06 0.012 0.37 -0.056∗∗ 0.01
(0.03) (0.01) (0.02)
Tax Wedge -0.498∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.092 0.10 -0.275∗∗∗ 0.00
(0.10) (0.05) (0.07)
Coordination of Wage Setting -0.010∗ 0.01 -0.009∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.002 0.49
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Union Density -0.084 0.25 -0.045 0.26 -0.018 0.70
(0.07) (0.04) (0.05)
Minimum Wage -0.066∗∗ 0.00 -0.019 0.14 -0.021 0.20
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Supply and demand conditions:
Ln(Skill Ratio) -0.553∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.605∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.147∗ 0.04
(0.11) (0.06) (0.07)
Ln(Share of UNR caused by LMIs) -0.004 0.95 -0.174∗∗∗ 0.00 0.104∗ 0.02
(0.06) (0.03) (0.04)
Ln(UNR controlled for Eﬀects of LMIs) -0.032 0.17 -0.015 0.22 0.004 0.79
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Ln(Skill)*Ln(UNR by LMIS) -0.084∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.116∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.005 0.69
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Ln(Skill)*Ln(UNR unaﬀ. by LMIs) 0.019 0.16 0.006 0.45 0.026∗∗ 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Trade and Technology:
Import Intensity -0.445∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.120 0.10 -0.291∗∗∗ 0.00
(0.13) (0.07) (0.06)
R&D Intensity -1.129∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.591∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.302∗ 0.03
(0.21) (0.11) (0.14)
Observations 420 420 423
Number of Countries 20 20 20
Avg years pr country 21.0 21.0 21.1
F-test of all the exogenous variables 424.77 (0.00) 503.39 (0.00) 244.18 (0.00)
F-test of institutional variables 101.25 (0.00) 100.24 (0.00) 72.05 (0.00)
F-test of non-institutional variables 195.58 (0.00) 258.42 (0.00) 131.56 (0.00)
R2 0.95 0.95 0.93
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
a) All estimations include dummies for countries and years and assumes country-level heteroscedasticity.
b) Numbers in parenthesis are standard deviations.
Variables:
The Beneﬁt Beplacement Ratio, Union Density, Minimum Wage, Import Intensity, R&D Intensity and Tax Wedge are proportions
with range (0-1), Beneﬁt Duration has a range (0-1.1) EPL Overall ranges (0-3) and Coordination ranges (1-5).
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Table 5: Labour market institutions, and separate measures of EPL for regular and tempo-
rary positions. Estimation Period 1985-2011
(1) (2) (3) (4)
9/1-Decile Ratio 9/5-Decile Ratio 5/1-Decile Ratio 9/1-Decile Ratio
Coef./se p-value Coef./se p-value Coef./se p-value Coef./se p-value
Institutional variables:
EPL for Regular contracts 0.013 0.62 0.039∗∗ 0.01 0.004 0.79
(0.03) (0.02) (0.01)
EPL for Temporary Contracts -0.013∗ 0.02 -0.005 0.10 -0.016∗∗∗ 0.00
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Beneﬁt Replacement Rate -0.091 0.09 -0.065∗ 0.03 -0.081∗ 0.02 -0.084 0.11
(0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05)
Beneﬁt Duration 0.014 0.67 0.023 0.15 0.006 0.80 0.011 0.73
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Tax Wedge -0.256∗ 0.02 -0.145∗ 0.02 0.045 0.56 -0.255∗ 0.02
(0.11) (0.06) (0.08) (0.11)
Coordination of Wage Setting -0.007 0.19 -0.003 0.30 -0.003 0.48 -0.008 0.14
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Union Density -0.029 0.77 -0.009 0.88 -0.004 0.95 -0.074 0.40
(0.10) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09)
Minimum Wage -0.007 0.86 0.031 0.14 -0.017 0.52 -0.002 0.97
(0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
Supply and demand conditions:
Ln(Skill Ratio) -0.099∗ 0.01 -0.002 0.92 -0.063∗ 0.03 -0.097∗ 0.01
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Ln(Unemployment Rate) -0.066∗∗ 0.01 -0.054∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.018 0.33 -0.067∗∗ 0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Ln(Unemploymentrate)*Ln(Skill Ratio) -0.020 0.21 -0.025∗ 0.02 0.002 0.83 -0.021 0.17
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Trade and Technology:
Import Intensity -0.369∗ 0.01 -0.166∗ 0.04 -0.201∗∗ 0.00 -0.332∗ 0.02
(0.15) (0.08) (0.07) (0.15)
R&D Intensity -1.034∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.416∗∗ 0.01 -0.237 0.19 -1.115∗∗∗ 0.00
(0.27) (0.16) (0.18) (0.26)
EPL Overall -0.044∗ 0.03
(0.02)
Observations 321 321 324 321
Number of Countries 20 20 20 20
Avg years pr country 16.1 16.1 16.2 16.1
F-test of all the exogenous variables 186.72 (0.00) 132.06 (0.00) 84.51 (0.00) 186.81 (0.00)
F-test of institutional variables 19.01 (0.01) 32.71 (0.00) 30.16 (0.00) 18.82 (0.01)
F-test of non-institutional variables 116.98 (0.00) 61.20 (0.00) 41.60 (0.00) 128.10 (0.00)
R2 0.96 0.95 0.80 0.96
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
a) All estimations include dummies for countries and years and assumes country-level heteroscedasticity
b) Numbers in parenthesis are standard deviations
Variables:
The Beneﬁt Replacement Ratio, Union Density, Minimum Wage, Import Intensity, R&D Intensity and Tax Wedge are proportions with
range (0-1),Beneﬁt Duration has a range (0-1.1) EPL for Regular and Temporary Contracts ranges (0-5) and Coordination ranges (1-5).
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Table 6: Labour market institutions, immigration, and interaction between minimum wage
and immigration on wage inequality. Estimation Period: 1973-2011
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
9/1-Decile Ratio 9/5-Decile Ratio 5/1-Decile Ratio 9/1-Decile Ratio 5/1-Decile Ratio
Coef./se p-value Coef./se p-value Coef./se p-value Coef./se p-value Coef./se p-value
Institutional variables:
Employment Protection Legislation(EPL) -0.070∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.023∗ 0.02 -0.057∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.070∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.057∗∗∗ 0.00
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Beneﬁt Replacement Rate -0.160∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.081∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.112∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.156∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.111∗∗∗ 0.00
(0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Beneﬁt Duration -0.069∗∗ 0.00 0.001 0.97 -0.052∗∗ 0.00 -0.061∗ 0.01 -0.053∗∗ 0.01
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Tax Wedge -0.493∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.119∗ 0.03 -0.262∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.494∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.270∗∗∗ 0.00
(0.09) (0.05) (0.06) (0.09) (0.06)
Coordination of Wage Setting -0.011∗∗ 0.00 -0.009∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.004 0.08 -0.011∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.004 0.07
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Union Density -0.174∗∗ 0.01 -0.164∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.001 0.99 -0.150∗ 0.03 0.001 0.98
(0.07) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04)
Minimum Wage -0.089∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.033∗ 0.02 -0.032∗ 0.03 -0.115∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.026 0.25
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Supply and demand conditions:
Ln(Skill Ratio) -0.120∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.008 0.67 -0.126∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.118∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.125∗∗∗ 0.00
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Ln(Unemployment Rate) -0.053∗ 0.02 -0.042∗∗ 0.00 0.006 0.66 -0.050∗ 0.03 0.005 0.75
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Ln(Unemploymentrate)*Ln(Skill Ratio) -0.002 0.89 -0.013 0.12 0.023∗∗ 0.01 -0.000 1.00 0.022∗ 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Trade and Technology:
Import Intensity -0.480∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.216∗∗ 0.00 -0.322∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.487∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.324∗∗∗ 0.00
(0.13) (0.08) (0.06) (0.13) (0.07)
R&D Intensity -0.758∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.461∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.123 0.38 -0.800∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.126 0.38
(0.21) (0.11) (0.14) (0.21) (0.14)
Immigration:
Net Immigration 0.861∗∗∗ 0.00 0.152 0.22 0.665∗∗∗ 0.00 0.684∗ 0.01 0.700∗∗∗ 0.00
(0.21) (0.12) (0.14) (0.27) (0.20)
Immigration if min wage 0.366 0.29 -0.056 0.82
(0.34) (0.24)
Observations 421 421 424 421 424
Number of Countries 20 20 20 20 20
Avg years pr country 21.1 21.1 21.2 21.1 21.2
F-test of all the exogenous variables 387.87 (0.00) 256.30 (0.00) 275.90 (0.00) 388.66 (0.00) 278.34 (0.00)
F-test of institutional variables 117.18 (0.00) 91.26 (0.00) 96.10 (0.00) 115.47 (0.00) 87.75 (0.00)
F-test of non-institutional variables 191.73 (0.00) 87.18 (0.00) 156.74 (0.00) 192.63 (0.00) 156.21 (0.00)
R2 0.95 0.94 0.93 0.95 0.93
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
a) All estimations include dummies for countries and years and assumes country-level heteroscedasticity
b) Numbers in parenthesis are standard deviations
Variables:
The Beneﬁt Replacement Ratio, Union Density, Minimum Wage, Import Intensity, R&D Intensity, Net Immigration and Tax Wedge are
proportions with range (0-1), Beneﬁt Duration has a range (0-1.1) EPL Overall ranges (0-3) and Coordination ranges (1-5)
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A Replication
This section replicates the main ﬁndings in Koeniger et al. (2007). The replication is done
in several steps: First, the main model in Koeniger et al. (2007) is estimated on revised data
but with the old ﬁgures for coordination and skill from Koeniger et al. (2007), since these
data are no longer available and cannot be updated from the original sources. Secondly, the
main model in Koeniger et al. (2007) is estimated on the revised data and new measures
of coordination and skill attainments, respectively from Visser (2011) and Barro and Lee
(2010). These results are the new baseline scenario, which can be compared with the results
of the extended data set in 4. The extended data set contains a longer time period and more
OECD countries.
Before we turn to the results of the replication, it is worth looking at the main changes
in the revised data (see appendix 3 for a comprehensive review). The ﬁgures for the income
deciles before 1990 in Sweden, is revised down compared to the data set in Koeniger et al.
(2007). This is detected by comparing the data in OECD (1996) Table 3.1 with the new
data from OECD (2010d). The ﬁgures for Germany is substantially diﬀerent compared to
the original data set. And the development in Germany shows that the 9/1 - decile ratio
became more compressed until the beginning of the 1990s, and then increased more slowly
towards the end of sample period than the original ﬁgures for Germany illustrated. In Italy
are the income distribution for men now more volatile than in the data set by Koeniger et al.
(2007). For all the other countries in the sample are the development in the decile ratios in
the previous and this revised data set, very similar. The largest changes in the labor market
institutions are found in the measure of beneﬁt replacement and beneﬁt duration, especially
for Canada. There are also level-diﬀerences in the measure of minimum wage for France and
the Netherlands. The data on wage dispersion for Canada in 1973 is no longer available,
and not included in the analysis. The measure of EPL was found in OECD (2010b), where
they exist from 1985 and onwards. The data was extended backwards using the growth
rate of the measure in the original paper. However, as mentioned in the introduction, to be
able to compare the revised results with the previous ﬁndings in Koeniger et al. (2007), the
replication is performed on the revised data and the time series for coordination and skill
attainment from Koeniger et al. (2007).
In spite of that the time series are revised, the labor market institutions do with the
exception of the union variables, still have a compressing signiﬁcant eﬀect on the wage
diﬀerentials, cf. Table A. Note that the replicated results are based on the revised data from
OECD and the old ﬁgures for coordination and skill from Koeniger et al. (2007). The scope
of the coeﬃcients in Koeniger et al. (2007) seem to be quite sensitive to revising the data,
cf. Figure A1, Figure A. The ﬁgure show the relative values of the estimated coeﬃcients
from estimation on the replication on the revised the original data. The relative value is
equal to one if the two estimations lead to the same coeﬃcient. The eﬀect of employment
protection legislation appears to be smaller in the replication than in Koeniger et al. (2007),
while beneﬁt replacement rate and tax wedge appear to have a more compressing eﬀect.
The estimated coeﬃcient of coordination and union density have changed sign, and have an
increasing eﬀect on the wage dispersion, but only union density is signiﬁcant.
Also the control variables changes due to the revision of the time series, but all variables,
except the unemployment rate, have the same eﬀects as in Koeniger et al. (2007).
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On the other hand, the new data sources for coordination and skill do not to change
the estimated coeﬃcients of the other variables to a large extent, cf. Figure A1, Figure A.
and B. The estimated eﬀect of unemployment rate is somewhat lower, but otherwise are the
coeﬃcients in line with the results on the revised data. The eﬀect of the new variable for
coordination is more in line with previous ﬁnding and compresses the wage diﬀerentials, but
is not signiﬁcant in the baseline scenario or in Koeniger et al. (2007). The new variable of
skill-attainment has gone from having an increasing eﬀect to having a compressing eﬀect
on the wage dispersion at the 9/1- and 5/1-decile ratio level, and is signiﬁcant. However,
skill-attainment was prolonged with trend in skill-attainment for the years after 1990 for the
US and after 1995 for the other countries in the sample in Koeniger et al. (2007) due to data
limitations at the time of investigation. A comparison of the new and original data show
that US after 1990 has turned out diﬀerently than the prolonging implied. If we exclude US
after 1990 in the original data set and estimate equation 1, the coeﬃcient of skill-attainment
becomes negative also here. The previous results for skill-attainment therefore seem less
robust. It is, however, reasonable to assume that an increase in relative supply of high-
skilled workers lowers their wages, as this is exactly what we ﬁnd when the US is excluded
after 1990 on the original data set and in the revised results. The results are now more in
line with what we expect from theory, as higher labor supply of high-skilled workers meets
the demand. We also consider the skill attainment to be more robust in the data series for
the extended sample, as the data has more variation across time and countries.
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A. Coordination and skill are provided by
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Figure A1: The estimated coeﬃcients from Table A and Koeniger et al. (2007). The relative
size is equal to one if the estimated coeﬃcients from the two tables are equal.
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Table A1: Replication of the preferred model in Koeniger et al. (2007). Estimation Period
1973-1998.
(1) (2) (3)
9/1-Decile Ratio 9/5-Decile Ratio 5/1-Decile Ratio
Coef./se p-value Coef./se p-value Coef./se p-value
Institutional variables:
Employment Protection Legislation(EPL) -0.08∗ 0.01 -0.07∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.03 0.21
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Beneﬁt Replacement Rate -0.39∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.17∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.23∗∗∗ 0.00
(0.06) (0.03) (0.04)
Beneﬁt Duration -0.17∗ 0.01 -0.05 0.12 -0.11∗ 0.01
(0.07) (0.03) (0.04)
Tax Wedge -0.81∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.33∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.32∗∗∗ 0.00
(0.15) (0.08) (0.10)
Coordination of Wage Setting 0.01 0.69 0.03 0.11 -0.02 0.38
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Union Density 0.26∗ 0.02 -0.01 0.88 0.16∗ 0.03
(0.11) (0.06) (0.07)
Minimum Wage -0.22∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.15∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.08∗ 0.02
(0.05) (0.02) (0.03)
Supply and demand conditions:
Ln(Skill Ratio) 0.16∗∗ 0.01 0.09∗∗ 0.00 0.07 0.07
(0.06) (0.03) (0.04)
Ln(Unemployment Rate) 0.03 0.23 -0.04∗∗ 0.01 0.07∗∗∗ 0.00
(0.03) (0.01) (0.02)
Ln(Unemploymentrate)*Ln(Skill Ratio) 0.05∗∗ 0.00 -0.02∗ 0.04 0.06∗∗∗ 0.00
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Trade and Technology:
Import Intensity 0.92∗ 0.03 0.68∗∗ 0.00 0.23 0.41
(0.42) (0.22) (0.27)
R&D Intensity -1.38∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.81∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.65∗∗ 0.00
(0.30) (0.17) (0.21)
Observations 169 169 169
Number of Countries 11 11 11
Avg years pr country 15.4 15.4 15.4
F-test of all the exogenous variables 590.26 (0.00) 460.87 (0.00) 332.01 (0.00)
F-test of institutional variables 311.67 (0.00) 246.78 (0.00) 163.23 (0.00)
F-test of non-institutional variables 80.23 (0.00) 58.78 (0.00) 76.99 (0.00)
R2 0.98 0.97 0.98
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
a) All estimations include dummies for countries and years and correct for country-level heteroscedasticity.
b) Numbers in parenthesis are standard deviations.
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Table A2: The new baseline scenario of the preferred model in Koeniger et al. (2007),
Estimation Period 1973-1998
(1) (2) (3)
9/1-Decile Ratio 9/5-Decile Ratio 5/1-Decile Ratio
Coef./se p-value Coef./se p-value Coef./se p-value
Institutional variables:
Employment Protection Legislation(EPL) -0.13∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.07∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.06∗∗ 0.00
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Beneﬁt Replacement Rate -0.33∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.16∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.19∗∗∗ 0.00
(0.05) (0.03) (0.04)
Beneﬁt Duration -0.11 0.10 -0.05 0.14 -0.07 0.10
(0.06) (0.04) (0.04)
Tax Wedge -0.67∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.24∗∗ 0.00 -0.26∗ 0.01
(0.15) (0.08) (0.10)
Coordination of Wage Setting -0.00 0.13 -0.00 0.13 -0.00 0.20
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Union Density 0.20 0.08 -0.07 0.29 0.14 0.06
(0.12) (0.06) (0.08)
Minimum Wage -0.25∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.16∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.10∗∗ 0.00
(0.05) (0.03) (0.03)
Supply and demand conditions:
Ln(Skill Ratio) -0.16∗∗ 0.00 0.00 0.97 -0.18∗∗∗ 0.00
(0.05) (0.03) (0.04)
Ln(Unemployment Rate) 0.00 0.95 -0.04∗∗ 0.00 0.06∗∗∗ 0.00
(0.03) (0.01) (0.02)
Ln(Unemploymentrate)*Ln(Skill Ratio) 0.04∗∗ 0.00 -0.02 0.06 0.06∗∗∗ 0.00
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Trade and Technology:
Import Intensity 0.50 0.22 0.47∗ 0.03 0.00 0.99
(0.41) (0.21) (0.27)
R&D Intensity -0.58 0.09 -0.45∗ 0.02 -0.04 0.85
(0.34) (0.19) (0.23)
Observations 169 169 169
Number of Countries 11 11 11
Avg years pr country 15.4 15.4 15.4
F-test of all the exogenous variables 631.36 (0.00) 390.61 (0.00) 452.60 (0.00)
F-test of institutional variables 285.66 (0.00) 220.51 (0.00) 157.29 (0.00)
F-test of non-institutional variables 62.72 (0.00) 43.69 (0.00) 73.33 (0.00)
R2 0.98 0.97 0.98
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
a) All estimations include dummies for countries and years and correct for country-level heteroscedasticity.
b) Numbers in parenthesis are standard deviations.
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B Data Appendix
The data appendix describes where the data used in this paper is found and how the variables
are build up.
Wage diﬀerentials:
The measure of wage inequality used in this paper is the ratio of 9th to 1th , 9th to 5th
(median), and 5th to 1th decile-ratio. The deciles are gross earnings of full-time dependent
male employees. Most of the numbers are from the OECD (2010d).
The data are prolonged backwards for some countries using OECD (1996), Table 3.1:
Austria 1980 to 1989, Belgium 1986 to 1990, Canada from 1981 to 1994, Germany from
1983 to 1991 and Italy from 1979 to 1985. For Norway and Denmark the data are extended
backwards using OECD (1996), Table 3.1, but by using the data for the total workforce
between 1980 and 1990.
Employment Protection Legislation Indicator (EPL):
The OECD indicators of EPL are synthetic indicators of the strictness of regulation on
dismissals of individuals or groups, and the procedures involved in hiring workers on ﬁxed-
term or temporary work agency contracts. They are compiled of 21 items, and divided
into three areas: Individual dismissal of workers with regular contracts, additional cost for
collective dismissals, regulations of temporary contracts, and an overall measure of EPL
which is an average of the indicators for regulations for temporary and regular contracts.
The main data source is OECD (2010c). The series is prolonged backwards by the
growth rate of the measure of employment protection “ep” in the Nickell (2006) database for
all countries before 1985, except New Zealand that was prolonged backwards before 1990.
The Nickell (2006) ﬁgures are based on the ﬁgures in Blanchard and Wolfers (2000).
Beneﬁt Replacement Rates:
The beneﬁt replacement rate is a measure of how much each unemployed worker receives
in beneﬁt from the government. OECD has information about the unemployment beneﬁts
for year 1, the average of year two and three, and the average of year four and ﬁve for
unemployed person in diﬀerent family situations and with diﬀerent initial income level. The
three diﬀerent family types are: Single, with a dependent spouse and with a working spouse.
The diﬀerent income levels are: 67 percent and 100 percent of average earnings. The
ﬁgures are the average over family types. This results in six diﬀerent groups: brraxy where
x = 67, 100 (the percent of average earnings) and y = 1, 2, 4 (the beneﬁts received in year
y). Year 2 is the average of year three and four, and year 4 is the average of year four and
ﬁve. The beneﬁt replacement rate is calculated by taking the average of the ﬁrst year brr671
and brr1001, while the other groups are used to calculate beneﬁt duration below.
The data is received from OECD by mail.
Beneﬁt Duration:
The beneﬁt duration is a measure of how long beneﬁts last when you are unemployed and
how the amount given changes over the duration. Beneﬁt duration is given by the equation:
bdx = α
brrx2
brrx1
+ (1− α) brrx4
brrx1
Where brrxy is the beneﬁt replacement rate for the employment situation x = 67, 100
received in year y = 67, 100. α = 0.6 and gives more weight to the second and third year as
38
compared to the fourth and ﬁfth year. Beneﬁt duration is equal to zero if beneﬁt replacement
stops after one year, i.e. brrx2 = brrx4 = 0, and bdx = 0. Beneﬁt duration is equal to one if
beneﬁts are equal in all of the years, i.e . brrx1 = brrx2 = brrx4, and bdx = 1. Some countries
have increasing beneﬁts with time and in those countries are bd > 1.
The data is based on the beneﬁt replacement ratio for diﬀerent groups, and are as de-
scribed above received from OECD by mail.
Tax Wedge:
Tax wedge is equal to the sum of the employment tax rate (t1), the direct tax rate (t2) and
the indirect tax rate (TW = t1 + t2 + t3). It measures the total amount the government
receives as an eﬀect of taxing the labor force. It can also be seen as the diﬀerence between
the employees take-home earnings and the total cost of employing them.
t1: is equal to employers actual tax payment calculated by taxes paid by the employer
to the government and the sum of wages received by employees (t1 = EC
IE−EC ). EC - Em-
ployers Social Security contributions are the actual or imputed payments to social insurance
schemes to make provision for social insurance beneﬁts. They may be made by employers on
behalf of their employees, self-employed or non-employed persons on their own behalf. The
contributions may be compulsory or voluntary and the schemes may be funded or unfunded.
IE - Compensation of employees is made up of two components, wages and salaries payable
in cash or in kind. These include the values of any social contributions, income taxes, etc.,
payable by the employee even if they are actually withheld by the employer and paid on
behalf of the employee.
t2: Direct Tax Rate is calculated by the following formula t2 = IT+WC
HRC
. Where WC- Em-
ployees social security contributions are the actual or imputed payments to social insurance
schemes to make provision for social insurance beneﬁts. They may be made by employers
on behalf of their employees, self-employed or non-employed persons on their own behalf.
The contributions may be compulsory or voluntary and the schemes may be funded or un-
funded. IT - Income tax is current taxes on income, wealth, etc. HCR- Current receipts of
households consist of all income to a household, whether monetary or in kind received by the
household or by individual members of the household. It includes income from employment,
investments, current transfers, etc.
t3: Indirect Tax Rate is calculated by the following formula t3 = TX−SB
CC
. Where TX -
Indirect taxes is taxes on consumption goods. SB - The value of subsidies is value of subsidies
paid by government. CC - Final consumption is ﬁnal consumption expenditure for entire
economy.
All variables were found in OECD National Accounts. EC (NFD12R), IE (NFD1R), WC
(NFD61P-NFD12R), IT (NFD5P), HCR (NFB5GR) were found in OECD (2013a), Table
14.A, for household sector, while SB (NFD3P) was found in OECD (2013a), Table 14.A,
for general government sector. TX(D2) was found in OECD (2013b), Table 10, for general
government sector. CC(P3) was found in OECD (2013c).
The series are extended backwards with the growth rate in the time series for tax wedge
used in Sparrman (2011) before 1995 for: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany,
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and Sweden. The time series are extended backwards before
the 1990 for UK and Italy, before 1975 for Finland, before 2002 for Ireland, Before 2000 for
Spain and before 1998 for US. Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Switzerland are replaced
for the entire time series.
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Coordination of Wage bargaining: The coordination of wage bargaining is based on
Kenworthys 5-point classiﬁcation of wage-setting, cf. Visser (2011). The measure is on a
scale of 1 to 5.
Trade Union Density:
Trade union density corresponds to the ratio of wage and salary earners that are trade union
members, divided by the total number of wage and salary earners (OECD Labor Force
Statistics). Density is calculated using survey data, wherever possible, and administrative
data adjusted for non-active and self-employed members otherwise.
The data source is OECD (2010f).
Minimum Wage:
The minimum wage is measures as the minimum wage relative to median wage and is taken
from OECD (2010a). The countries with no minimum wage are set to zero.
Unemployment Rate (UNR):
The standardized unemployment rate (UNR) is from OECD (2013d). The data are prolonged
backward for some countries, using the growth rate of numbers found in older versions of
OECDs Economic Outlook: for Germany for Former Federal Republic of Germany before
1992 using numbers from OECD (2011a), Ireland before 1990 using OECD (2012) and Spain
before 1967 using OECD (2005).
Education attainment:
This is the ratio of the overall population over 15 with some level of tertiary education.
The data are taken from the Barro-Lee database, Barro and Lee (2010), on educational
attainment, where levels are given every ﬁfth year. We have ﬁlled in in the missing years by
linear approximation.
Import intensity
The import intensity is measured by imports over value added in the manufacturing sector.
Gross value added is the value of output subtracted the value of intermediate consumption.
It is a measure of the contribution to GDP made by an individual producer, industry or
sector. The numbers are taken from OECD (2010e).
R&D intensity
The R&D intensity is measured by the R&D cost over value added in the manufactur-
ing sector.The numbers for R&D cost in the manufacturing sector are taken from OECD’s
ANBERD database OECD (2011d), while the numbers for value added are collected from
OECD (2010e). The OECD’s ANBERD database presents annual data on industrial R&D
expenditures. Time series are available from 1987 to 2010.
OECD’s ANBERD data base is prolonged backwards by the growth rate before 1987
with data in OECD (2011c). The latter data source contains information in the time period
1973 to 1997 (or 1998). Data for Germany consists of data for Former Federal Republic of
Germany prior to 1991. In addition, the time series for Austria was missing in the period
1999 to 2001, and was interpolated. The time series in New Zealand was missing in every
second year from 1994 to 2008 and interpolated as well. The missing observations in Sweden
before 1995 are replaced by observations from the Eurostat (2012), variable “rd e berdcost”.
Immigration:
The measure of immigration is found in Nations (2010), table for Net Migration Rate. The
data is provided for every ﬁfth year, and is interpolated.
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Figure B1: Overall EPL
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Figure B2: EPL for Regular Contract
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Figure B3: EPL for Temporary Contract
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Figure B4: The Share of Workers in Temporary Positions
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Figure B5: Unemployment Beneﬁt Replacement Rate
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Figure B6: Development of the Unemployment Beneﬁt Duration
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Figure B7: Development of the Tax Wedge
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Figure B8: Development of the Coordination of Wage Setting
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Figure B9: Development of the Union Density
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Figure B10: Development of the Minimum Wage in Countries That Have Minimum Wage
Set at a National Leve
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Figure B11: Development of the Unemployment Rate
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Figure B12: Development of the Education Attainment
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Figure B13: Development of import intensity
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Figure B14: Development of R&D intensity
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Figure B15: Development of Net Immigration
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